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ABSTRACT
Neoliberalism has provoked profound and diverse consequences for rural Mexico, escalating the agricultural crisis
for producers and workers in various sectors. Against this context, recent improvements in the sugar sector raise
interesting questions about its relative economic success under the neoliberal paradigm. This article contrasts two
cane zones--one that experienced economic recovery and another affected by abandonment of the sugar mill--to
argue that in the interstices of modernizing neoliberalism, cane growers and mill workers who were subjected to
politics of exclusion struggle to ensure the survival of their culture, community, and economic livelihood. [key
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Culture, Ideology, and Community: The Dynamics of Accommodation
and Resistance to Restructuring of the Mexican Sugar Sector

Structural transformations induced by neoliberal economic policies are reshaping the Mexican countryside
and augmenting social and economic polarization. This fact is particularly striking in the sugar sector where
neoliberalism provokes profound and diverse consequences for Mexican sugarcane growers and mill workers.
With the privatization of sugar mills from 1988 to 1992, this sector experienced the worst economic crisis in its
history, a crisis that affected both new private mill owners and cane producers. Declining productivity, market
disruption, bankrupt mills, and astronomically large debts owed by producers in the early years following
privatization appeared to match crisis conditions associated with austerity measures in other sectors of the rural
economy. In recent years, however, many cañeros (cane growers) have recovered their losses, sugar mills are
again profitably operating, and Mexico has regained its export capacity in sugar. This economic recovery--at a
time when other sectors of the rural economy continue to suffer the impact of economic restructuring--raises
important questions about the apparent success of the sugar sector under neoliberalism. In part, this achievement
was accomplished by preferential economic support to more productive sugar mills and to cane growers with
greater productive potential, while selectively eliminating others through the "politics of exclusion" (Gledhill
1995:23), or what may be considered a strategy of "economic triage" (Gates 1993:59) by private mill owners. In
this paper I address the divergent experiences of cañeros and mill workers who continue to maintain their
contractual relationship with sugar mills and those who, through economic triage, were excluded from what may
be properly considered "la cultura cañera."
I argue that the implementation of neoliberal economic reform entails profound economic consequences, but
just as important, involves a consequential impact on culture, ideology, and community. Cultural traditions,
ideological orientations, and the nature of community life were dynamically constituted during several centuries
of struggle and conflict over the production of sugar cane. Cultural ideologies held by diverse groups of cane
growers, as well as by mill owners, were themselves subject to transformation as the sector passed from private to
state control, later to be privatized under the neoliberal paradigm. After a brief overview of historical events that
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contributed to the current context, I contrast two case studies from western Mexico, one community in which the
majority of cañeros recovered from the economic crisis which threatened to close the regional sugar mill in the
early 1990s, and another community that struggled to survive after the bankruptcy and closure of its sugar mill.
These two cases illustrate the multiplex effects of privatization and the complexity of forms that cañeros' and
workers' strategies of accommodation and resistance take for the preservation of a cultural tradition and way of
life.
The culture of cane production, constituted during the colonial era, emerged from a symbiotic relationship
between sugar haciendas and rural communities. The violent upheaval of the Mexican revolution culminated in a
structural change in relations between the hacienda, that had depended on the work force of rural communities
and campesinos, who depended on the hacienda for their livelihood. The revolution redefined the ideologies of
both mill owners and campesinos, as agrarian reform severed the unity of field and factory previously maintained
by sugar mills. Subsequently, economic and political hegemony within the sector shifted; yet whether
characterized by economic liberalism under private control, or paternalism and populism under state control,
relations with cañeros--who held rights to the land and provided the raw material to the industry, and mill owners,
who controlled economic resources and decision making--remained contentious.
Mill owners, culturally defined as antagonists, exploited cane growers; and cañeros, in turn, were categorized
by mill owners as dependent, lazy, illiterate, productively inefficient, and wasteful of economic resources.
Elements of these ideological orientations persist, even as neoliberalism transforms relations among social actors.
Illustrative of these notions is the sugar industry representative who criticized cane growers for lack of a work
ethic: "They are lazy people. Cañeros want to receive money without working." Even union leaders may show
lack of support for their constituency through adoption of this neoliberal rhetoric: "The union needs to change the
mentality of the producer. Cañeros need to be more responsible, more like capitalists. Cañeros need discipline
because they resist change and much ignorance still persists. The union must put into the head of each cañero that
they respect the work requirements (union leader, Michoacán)."
Cañeros, on the other hand, relate their labor as cane producers to cultural identities and to their
contradictory relationship with the mill owners. They talk frequently about the extensive knowledge acquired to
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produce sugar cane for the industry, the contingent responsibilities of being a cañero, and the sacrifices they
make:
The cultivation of cane has been a culture here in Mexico. It is the most social of crops because in
reality, that is where the society is--cane production maintains many families. It is a culture; it has
endured 300 years. The cañero works, produces, and passes the land on to his sons [sic]. The rest of
the family works in the planting, cultivation, and harvest--they have a hand in the raw material. What
gives life to many people and villages in cane zones is precisely the cane. But to be a cañero is to
suffer. We have relied on our own family in our struggle. Our strikes have been repressed, but this is
our patrimony, our form of living. To be a cañero is a culture." (cane grower, Michoacán).
These words reveal cultural knowledge regarding the tradition of cane production, its significance for
families and communities, and its insertion in Mexico's history. Below I outline the salient factors that gave
shape to conflictive relations between cañeros, sugar mills, and the state, and how these relations were
transformed over time.
HACIENDAS TO AGRARIAN CERTIFICATES
Sugar mills, first established in Mexico in the 16th century, rapidly became the hub of the colonial economy.
Soon the hacienda emerged as the institution that structured access to land, labor, and capital, thus historically
constituting contradictory relations among social actors: the state, mill owners, and campesinos (rural producers)
(Crespo et al. 1988, 1990; Landázuri and Vázquez 1988; von Wobeser 1988). Although there are regional
differences, numerous campesino communities resisted hacienda encroachment on their lands and the
displacement of subsistence crops by sugar cane. Since the early colonial period campesinos have been active
agents in defending their culture and community (von Wobeser 1988). Nonetheless, the state supported the
accumulation of wealth and land by hacendados (hacienda owners), which guaranteed the social reproduction of
the hacienda (Landázuri and Vázquez 1988, Melville 1979). Indeed, the hacienda survived in some regions until
the 1930s, and many cañeros recall a time when they or their parents worked as debt peons for local hacendados.
While hacendados promoted the modernization of capitalist mills in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, they
simultaneously fomented the development of an antagonistic peasantry that would join forces with other social
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groups in the Mexican revolution to overthrow the landed oligarchy. The campesino component of the
revolution, led by Emiliano Zapata, the martyred culture hero of the Mexican revolution, emerged in a region with
a long cultural tradition of cane production.
After the revolution, the 1917 Constitution provided, through Article 27, for the redistribution of former
hacienda lands to campesinos. Most hacendados were able to retain a small portion of land but over time,
particularly in the 1930s, the government allocated the majority of former hacienda lands to campesinos. The
creation of ejidos severed cane lands from haciendas. In the process, it created a major structural change which
displaced the traditional landed oligarchy and disrupted the former unity of land and sugar mill that had allowed
hacendados dual control of field and factory. Nonetheless, the state, mill owners, and cane growers continue to be
linked in conflictive and accommodative relations over land, labor, and capital. From the 1930s to the 1950s,
cane growers with scarce resources were tied to private mill owners through contractual relationships under a
system of oligopoly capitalism (Purcell 1981). Over time, increased state intervention in the sector and a freeze
on the price of sugar caused owners to decapitalize the industry and the government gradually took control of
insolvent mills (Crespo et al. 1988, 1990; del Villar 1976). State-owned mills, notorious for productive
inefficiency and mismanagement, were operated under the ideological pretext of a state-campesino alliance (Paré
1987). Cañeros thus accommodated themselves to 20 years of state paternalism beginning in the early 1970s,
wherein the sugar sector and the price of cane was subsidized.
The economic crisis of the early 1980s brought to a dramatic end extensive state involvement in the
economy. Under the neoliberal policies of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (198894), parastatal enterprises were privatized, supported by an ideology of free markets, private investment,
modernization, productive efficiency, and the replacement of paternalistic relations with competitive
individualism. Within the sugar sector, these policies involved the sale of sugar mills to private investors, many
of whom sought quick profits through speculation, and others who sought access to cheap raw material for
processed foods and beverages. Privatization resulted in the consolidation of 49 sugar mills into 12 groups,
administered by private investors. Owners of soft drink franchises were strongly represented in these groups:
Consorcio AGA (Mexican soft drinks), Consorcio Azucarero Escorpión and Grupo Azucarero México (Pespsi),
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Grupo Beta San Miguel and Promotora Industrial Azucarera (Coca-Cola). While families with a long tradition of
sugar production operate some sugar mills, "neoazucareros" (new sugar industrialists) entered recently, in order to
turn quick profits with mills purchased at depressed prices.
Eleven mills remain unincorporated into groups and the government still holds one of several mills that were
returned to the state after privatization. Three mills--El Higo, Mahuixtlán, and Melchor Ocampo--that were
owned by the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC), the national campesino union with which the cane
growers' union (UNPCA, Unión Nacional de Productores de Caña de Azúcar) is associated, were declared
bankrupt and resold to Grupo Zucarmex. Grupo Escorpión purchased one of the two producers' cooperatives,
Emiliano Zapata, and the other, El Mante, was sold to the long-time sugar industrialist and owner of Grupo Sáenz.
These sales brought to an end the involvement of cane growers as associates in the ownership of mills. Four
mills, according to neoliberal standards, were deemed inefficient and closed.
Sugar mills were sold in packages of both "good" and "bad" factories. Grupo Beta, purchaser of the
Quesería (Colima) mill, discussed below, owns mills that rank in the top ten and among the lowest ten in factory
efficiency. Among the last to be privatized were the five mills in Michoacán. The Santa Clara and San Sebastián
(Michoacán) mills were sold in 1992 to Grupo Porres; these rank second and third in the nation for factory
efficiency; Porres' factory at Huixtlán (Chiapas) ranks 51, of 61 total mills. The Lázaro Cárdenas (Michoacán)
mill was sold to Grupo Azucarero Mexicano. Grupo Santos purchased the facilities at Pedernales and Puruarán
(Michoacán), one of the two case studies presented here. At the time of purchase Grupo Santos was associated
with Gamesa (a huge Mexican cookie and food processing conglomerate); the latter was subsequently bought by
Pepsi. Two other mills owned by Grupo Santos rank fifth and sixth for factory efficiency; a fifth mill is among
the ten least productive. Originally the Confederación Nacional de Productores Rurales (CNPR, formerly CNPP)
was to enter a joint venture with 49% ownership in the four mills, but for lack of financing and because private
ownership was the objective of restructuring, the cane growers' union was ultimately pressured into ceding 100%
ownership to Grupo Santos. At the end of the first harvest season, the owner closed the Puruarán mill, claiming
that it was unprofitable.
Following the transfer of sugar mills to private control, government subsidies were slashed, market opening
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and excessive imports periodically flooded the sugar market, access to credit for cane production became more
restricted, and modifications to Article 27 of the Constitution raised new questions about the relationship of
cañeros to sugar mills and the Mexican state. These modifications ended a state-campesino alliance that had
traditionally guaranteed land rights to rural producers. Competition in this new neoliberal economic space, as
indicated by Singelmann, has forced cañeros to confront the withdrawal of customary political patronage and
economic guarantees (1995:6). As explained by a cane union leader in Michoacán, "The private industrialists
came and the politics changed. Our relationship is difficult; we can't accommodate very well and they don't
accept the politics of the cañero, either." The relationship between cañeros and privatized mills may increasingly
be affected by changes in land use in future years, since modifications to Article 27 allow the rental and sale of
ejido parcels (agrarian reform land). In 1996, the Los Mochis (Sinaloa) mill was renting 80% of the cane lands
from former cañeros; while this case is unique, the practice of renting land by sugar mills is on the increase.
Industrialists show little concern for displaced cañeros. One of the national representatives of the Cámara
Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera (the national chamber of mill industrialists), when asked what
had happened to ex-cañeros at Los Mochis, replied, "Many migrated out, but they are enjoying the money and
drinking liquor with the rent they received for the land." In numerous cases, mills are taking over the land of
unproductive cañeros who are unable to repay debts; theoretically the land is to be returned when the debt is paid
and the land is once again productive. It remains to be seen whether outright land purchases and transfer of land
to sugar mills will become more prevalent. Today, most ejidatarios (former recipients of agrarian reform land)
hold agrarian certificates which open the door for the first time to the legal right to sell former ejido land as
private property. The potential alienation of land from the cane grower was a particularly perilous situation in
1992, when 14 sugar mills were on the verge of bankruptcy and cane growers, who once profited from the sale of
cane to sugar mills, found themselves deeply in debt at the end of the harvest. Many abandoned sugarcane
production. To some analysts, the crisis created by loss of productivity, debt, and changes in land tenure
following privatization of the industry epitomized the failure of neoliberal policies. By 1993, however, a quite
different scenario had emerged. New investments had seemingly rejuvenated the industry and former cane
growers were returning to cane production and investing their own resources and labor to improve yields and
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profits.
What, then, does the changing structure of the sugar sector signify for cane growers and mill workers? After
the initial shocks that rocked the sugar sector in the early 1990s, by 1996 there was a trend toward stabilization
and profitability for both mill owners and cañeros, on the one hand, and a less-observed polarization that was
excluding traditional cane growers, on the other. Maintaining an ideology of neoliberal modernization,
industrialists and government officials alike are quick to point out the impressive achievements of the last few
years. These include: greater surface harvested, more cane processed, more sugar produced, more sugar per
hectare, more sucrose in the cane, higher factory yield, and less consumption of petroleum (see Table 1). Many
cañeros also recognize improvements in production and profits, as former cane growers return and new producers
enter production.
[Table 1 here]
These data appear to lend credence to the ideology of neoliberalism, that is, privatization improves
efficiency. Essential to the neoliberal agenda is the selective integration of more productive cañeros into the
newly privatized sector and simultaneously, massive layoffs of excess mill workers, and exclusion of cañeros who
demonstrate less productive potential. In the sugar sector, exclusion may apply to individual cañeros who are
refused credit for continued production, and to entire communities, where mills are deemed inefficient and closed.
The selective process takes multiple forms and is differentially expressed in distinct cane-producing regions of
Mexico. Below I turn to two cases that illustrate the multiplex forms of accommodation and resistance that
cañeros and mill workers deploy in responding to economic transformation.
SURMOUNTING THE CRISIS THROUGH ACCOMMODATION
The Quesería mill in the western state of Colima was sold in 1989 to Grupo Beta San Miguel, which markets
sugar to Coca-Cola, Nestle, and several Mexican food processors. Though about to close its doors in 1990, recent
investments to improve the factory and more exacting work demands have increased productivity of field and
factory (see Table 2). A portion of this increase is attributed to the recent closing of the Purísima (Jalisco) mill;
its 600 cane growers deliver 60,000 tons of cane to Quesería. Innovative use of containers for cane harvest, first
developed at Motzorongo (Veracruz) in 1994 to support harvested cane above the ground, has all but eliminated
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large rocks and other debris that previously entered the mill, damaged machinery, and resulted in stoppages. With
new, higher-yielding varieties of cane, improved organization of the harvest schedule, and more rapid processing
of cane, the mill and cane producers have seen profits for the past two years. The mean profit for growers in 1996
was $4000 new pesos (approximately $533 US) per hectare. Debts owed by cane growers at Quesería totaled
$1,200,000 new pesos (about $160,000 U.S.), in contrast to the historically highest debt of $5,317,940,890 old
pesos (about $1,772,647 U.S.) in 1991.
[Table 2 here]
To analyze these processes from the perspectives of cane producers and mill officials, it is necessary to
consider the multiple forms of conflict, struggle, encounter, and the divergent ideologies and discourses that
undergird the ongoing negotiation in the processes of accommodation and exclusion that characterize relations
between officials and producers (de Vries and Zendejas 1995). Mill officials, strongly influenced by neoliberal
ideology, have developed cultural understandings of their relationship with cane growers.
The manager at Quesería, for example, attributed changes in the region to factors much broader than a mere
shift in mill ownership. Since they no longer receive subsidies, cane growers, he explained, are now "socios"
(partners, or associates) of the owners. Before, he claimed, cañeros abused the system by depending on
government for everything. They received more money in loans than needed or could be repaid and were often
indebted to the mill. Now the mill provides only partial credit for production and growers must pay a portion of
expense out of pocket. The policy, in accord with FINA (Financiera Nacional Azucarera, S.A.), sets differential
amounts of credit according to the producer's yield, which encourages greater investment in higher-yielding
fields. The manager stated: "We changed the mentality of the cane grower--now he is like a businessman." In
part, the mill manager attributed the positive change in cañeros' attitude to a cane grower capacitation program to
develop human resources, established by Grupo Beta. This program of formal courses, presented by
psychologists, was designed to "sensitize" cañeros, to instill optimism, to develop cooperative thought, and selfesteem. This was particularly important during the crisis, when many cañeros were abandoning cane production;
the mill manager appeared at these meetings to convince cane growers not to lose faith.
For those who do not comport themselves as competitive "businessmen," and for those who have debts, the
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Quesería mill denies credit and appropriates the land until the debt is paid. The mill currently rents 200 hectares
from ejidatarios for cane production, paying the landowner $700-$800 pesos per hectare. While Grupo Beta
claims not to be interested in purchasing privatized ejido lands, the manager views the sale of parcels as an
advantage: "He who buys land, works it." Those who have not assimilated the neoliberal ideology continue to be
perceived as backward, lazy, and inefficient. The mill manager admits that adjustments to neoliberal policies
were difficult. Although producers initially received few earnings, he explains, "Neoliberalism is like the Bible;
the Bible says that 'he who does not work does not eat.'" The Bible is thus used to justify the fallout from
neoliberal modernization--those who are subject to policies of exclusion.
Cane production in the state of Colima evolved over the years into a culturally embedded production
strategy. Transformations in the sugar industry since privatization led cañeros to redefine their strategies,
struggles, and cultural ideologies, at times in response to, and at other times as proactive tactics to cope with the
implementation of neoliberal policies. In the mid-1980s, due to the many benefits they identified with sugar cane
as a production strategy, cañeros were overwhelmingly positive about their relationship with the state and its
patronage. By the early 1990s, in stark contrast to previous years, privatization of the industry had produced an
ideological reorientation of cañero culture. Many cañeros expressed their opposition to the government, the new
mill owners, and the declining economic position of cane growers by abandonment of cane production--which
reached a peak in 1990-91. With over half of the cañeros in debt to the sugar mill, they had lost their relatively
prestigious economic position. In the words of one cañero, the contradiction between the idealized past and
present was expressed: "I remember when I was a boy and they said 'God and Cane;' that's what they said. I was
a boy and I thought, 'What does this mean?' Well, in that time, yes, they profited. And now, everyone is left with
pure debt."
If the contrast between the pre- and post-privatization periods (until 1989, and 1989-94) is remarkable, the
changes from the early 1990s, when the crisis was at its zenith, and the current situation is equally striking.
Cañeros have reformulated ideologies concerning cane production in part due to increasing profits and in part
because the crisis in the rural economy discouraged alternative production strategies. Cane is currently the
principle crop from which a profit can be derived. To cut costs, the mill dismissed half its workers (their numbers
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declined from 566 in 1991 to 291 in 1996), causing an increase in out-migration; yet cañeros were returning once
more, increasing their numbers from 1373 in 1991 to 1556 in 1996. Thus, policies of exclusion and inclusion
differentially affected factory workers and cane producers.
But economic triage was also practiced against cañeros, creating differences in perception of whether they
are truly "socios" with the sugar mill. Some cañeros, for example, perceive themselves to be "socios," since they
depend on the mill for processing cane, yet the mill must depend on them for raw material. The cultural
definition of cañeros--as providers of the essential raw material--is notably prevalent among producers; cañeros
readily realize that their traditional knowledge, their labor, and their cooperation are crucial ingredients in this
major agroindustry that benefits the entire nation. Others, however, culturally define their relationship with the
mill as one of exploitation, rather than "socios." A more critical cañero reflected on the mill manager's statement-that neoliberalism is like the Bible (he who does not work, does not eat)--and replied, "The Bible also says, 'take
what you need for the day,' not accumulate!" Ambivalence is more characteristic of others, who see themselves
as "socios," yet say that mill officials view them as inferiors ("microbes," as put by one cañero).
A major factor in restructuring the relationship between cañeros and mill officials is the change, essential for
cane production, in credit distribution. Credit now depends on cane yields and producers are expected to pay a
portion of their own costs. Yet despite credit restrictions, land that in 1990 was abandoned for cattle raising or
subsistence maize production was being reconverted to cane by 1996. A constant complaint in 1990, because of
the cost, was the demand by the mill to replant cane fields with new varieties. Though the majority resisted doing
so, by 1996 many cañeros had replanted or planned to do so with the new, higher-yielding varieties. Today there
is talk of the improved quality of new varieties. The planting of new cane represents a significant change, since it
requires that a substantial cost be borne without credit from the mill. In contrast to mill officials, who believe in
making cañeros individually responsible for investing in their production, a number of cañeros complain that
those who lack resources for cane cultivation suffer decreasing yields, fall into debt, and will be denied further
credit. A prevalent fear exists: in restricting credit and repossessing cane fields for which debts are not paid,
ultimately, those with more resources will accumulate land, and those with fewer will lose access. One cañera put
it, "Many of these parcels of land are going to be taken away. Once improvements are made, the same
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government [that gave them] is going to take them from us." Nonetheless, while some complain about not
receiving sufficient credit for production, many cañeros acquiesce with new mill policies, acknowledging that
with less credit, fewer are in debt; even they have accommodated to the charge of mill officials--cañeros wasted
the money that they formerly received from the mill. One cañero explained that it was "hard" the first year, but
now they are saving money by force.
In 1992, the Mexican Constitution was revised, allowing for the regularization and titling of ejido parcels;
ejido members may now vote to privatize their parcels. As well, the sugar mill began to require ejidatarios to
present the new land title (Certificado Parcelario) before receiving credit for cane production. Though most
ejidatarios retain their land, others have converted parcels to private property (Dominio Pleno) and sold them.
The majority of ejidatarios, including cañeros, express positive attitudes toward the modifications to Article 27.
Since ejidatarios received their titles in 1993, an often heard comment is, "Now the land is mine; I can do with it
what I want." Yet when asked about the long-range consequences, the responses were overwhelmingly negative.
A cañero who agreed with privatization explained, "People are now free to sell their parcels, but the land could
end up in the hands of the wealthy. Before there were haciendas and large landowners; it could return to the same
situation." Dissident voices, however, criticize the privatization of ejido parcels. The few that opposed it--a
stronger tendency among those with a longer family tradition of cane culture--felt pressure to comply with the
majority decision to privatize. One cañera, whose father took part in the violent struggle for ejido land that ended
in the assassination of several campesinos from her community, related:
They screwed us. We had to agree with the majority. Later, they are going to chase us from the ejido;
they are going to crush us. The government is going to be left with the ejido. My father left the land to
me to help me, not for me to sell. My parents fought for the land, they suffered, and I want to pass it to
my sons. In the revolution, the people, without eating--man! how they suffered. How easily the people
sell the land now. I don't want to sell. I was a widow with four sons and I was enduring the hunger, but
it would have pained me to sell it.
Along with their concern over the alienation of ejido lands, cañeros of the zone preoccupy themselves with
the environmental deterioration associated with cane production. Cultural definitions of environmental problems
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held by mill officials and cañeros are also contradictory. Many growers see cane production as unsustainable
(e.g., annual burning of cane fields, deforestation, drying of soils, destruction of animal habitats, and air
pollution). The mill manager, however, rationalized these well-known criticisms: "Sugar mills," he claimed, "are
ecological, because the cane plant produces oxygen all year long. This is not recognized by environmentalists."
This view is not shared by cañeros of the zone, for whom this benign perception excludes the realities of health
hazards posed by excessive use of agrochemicals. The sugar mill now uses a plane to spray fields and combat
cane plagues, but fails to warn cañeros and workers laboring in the fields. On these occasions workers observe
that small animals die and humans suffer severe skin rashes. According to villagers, the cancer incidence has
increased dramatically in recent years. Thus the environmental ideology neglects the health of cañeros, otherwise
considered "socios" of the mill.
Just as neoliberalism forces cañeros to culturally redefine their relationship to land and economic resources,
it also presents a challenge to their identity as autonomous actors. Illustrative of this is the extension of mill
control over cañeros, from credit and production decisions, into the arena of self-identity. Grupo Beta established
capacitation courses to increase optimism and ensure stability among cane producers. Two textbooks (Aguilar
1995a; 1995b) published by Grupo Beta San Miguel, "Optimism Predominates" and "Self-Esteem Predominates,"
were used in these classes. The texts, written at an elementary level, included various quizzes and exercises; one
question asked, "Do cañeros feel like socios?" followed by, "Do you know how we are socios?" The text then
explains that all CNC members are "socios" in UNAGRA, the new credit union that operates through the mill.
The partnership, thus defined, is narrowly economic. A very self-confident and active cañera who serves on the
board of the cane growers' union and who had attended the course, received high scores for self-esteem. Others,
she explained, who received low scores, were mortified by their performance. While the objective was to make
cañeros feel optimistic and instill a sense of responsibility (for example, not taking unnecessary credit that would
lead them into debt), the result was offensive and patronizing. Cultural interaction between mill officials and
cañeros is still tinged with ethnocentric attitudes; it is the cañeros who must assimilate to the culture of
neoliberalism.
The increasing economic profitability of sugar cane production in Colima has not eliminated strategically
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opposed interests or reservations about the long-range impact of changes in land tenure and access to credit. In
general, however, both mill personnel and cañeros demonstrate heightened satisfaction with recent developments,
despite environmental problems. Cañeros in Colima have accomodated to the neoliberal policies of the sugar
industry and with the exception of inefficient producers who were excluded from sugar production, a substantial
majority are again earning profits. Yet in other regions, neoliberal policies have spelled economic doom to entire
communities and led mill workers and cañeros to resist policies of economic triage, a case to which I turn below.
RESISTING ECONOMIC TRIAGE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNITY SURVIVAL
"It is very delicate." "That is a political issue." These are the responses by industry officials in Mexico City
and mill and union personnel in Michoacán when asked about the Puruarán sugar mill. After informing me that
"The community lives from the sugar mill," an official of the Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Azucareras, who
was willing to talk about Puruarán, explained that the closure of the Puruarán sugar mill "really had no effect on
the community."
Puruarán, with a population of 15,000, has a cultural tradition of cane production going back almost 300
years. Spaniards founded the Hacienda of Puruarán for the production of sugar cane in 1715. Over the years, the
culture of cane production, along with its knowledge, traditions, and social relations, passed from generation to
generation. Community members, most of their lives, labored in the mill or the field, as did their parents before
them. Hacienda Puruarán, owned by Aurelio and Gerardo Bastarrachea since 1883, was sold to Joaquin Oseguera
during the final years of the revolution. Oseguera maintained the hacienda until 1923 when it was subsequently
acquired by José Gómez Arreola, and later, by an American, Tomás B. Boyd. Campesinos recall that Boyd
allowed cattle to destroy their maize and bean crops because he wanted land planted in cane. For 18 years, from
1926 to 1944, before being granted ejidos, campesinos struggled for the redistribution of hacienda lands. When
President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz suspended credit to the mill in 1966, it was temporarily abandoned. The governor
at that time, Augustín Arriaga Rivera, reopened the mill by declaring it for the benefit of workers, cañeros, and
the community (Caso 1987). Mill workers and cañeros consider the mill the patrimony of the nation, yet, this
community has struggled against the consequences of a neoliberal policy of exclusion for the past four years. The
mill was finally closed on May 31, 1992.
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The privatization of Mexican sugar mills epitomizes the neoliberal economic model, since most mills were
transferred from the state to various corportate groups, headed by wealthy and politically powerful industrialists.
Puruarán, under state control for 21 years, was privatized in 1992 and was then sold to a northern industrialist and
senator from the state of Nuevo Leon. The sale of Ingenio Puruarán falls under the rubric of neoliberalism in yet
another way: the senator received thanks--in the form of the purchase of four sugar mills--in return for his
support leading to modification of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. He not only supported the
modifications but played a role in designing the formula to title and transfer ejido parcels into private property.
While privatization of ejido land is voluntary, possession of land collateral subjects ejidatarios indebted to
captialist enterprises or banks to potential confiscation of their land.
The sale proposal stipulated that Empresas Gamesa, the corporate group that was to purchase the mill, would
acquire 51% ownership, leaving CNPP cane producers with 49% ownership. Four mills were included in the
purchase--Alianza Popular (San Luis Potosí), Bella Vista (Jalisco), Pedernales (Michoacán), and Puruarán. But
national CNPR leaders signed an agreement with the purchaser giving him full ownership of the four mills. Mill
workers and cane growers were incensed. They considered it a fraudulent action that hurt the entire nation.
Clauses VIII, XVI, XIX, and XX of the sale contract, in particular, commit the purchaser to preserve the industry
and improve the industrial unit, so that it continues to be productive and generate employment. In this sense,
former mill workers and growers view the sale as unconstitutional--since these are important obligations that the
purchaser should uphold for the good of the nation.
Those whose livelihoods were affected by the sale found it incomprehensible that Salinas de Gortari sold all
the sugar mills in the country without taking into consideration the damage that it would create for families in
cane-growing regions. According to some residents of Puruarán, salinismo (the neoliberal politics of President
Carlos Salinas Gortari) brought uncertainty to the majority of Mexicans, sacking the nation, and "not benefitting
the poor, but making them poorer." The May 14, 1992 visit of Salinas de Gortari to the city of Tacámbaro
presents a peculiar irony for mill workers and growers. The visit culminated in a development plan that was to
create employment and help the economies of 11 municipalities; a few weeks later (May 31), the new owner
closed Ingenio Puruarán, under the pretext that it was unprofitable.
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In fact, the Puruarán mill, like other state-managed enterprises, operated in the red. Community members
explain that the mill is capable of generating profits, and that research demonstrates the potential utility of the
mill. Former mill workers and cañeros moreover, share a belief that the profits were directed to personal uses or
election campaigns. Mill owners, they assert, together with politicians, made a "great business" of changing
numbers from black to red. The Comisariado Ejidal of Puruarán claimed that, "It is certain that the mill was in the
red, but this is what they [the mill owners] did, because there was much plundering of money, both in the field
and in the factory. They did their dirty work, hurting the workers, and all this made the sugar mill unprofitable."
The rationale for subjecting thousands of residents of the region to unemployment can be measured against
data that reveal the place of Ingenio Puruarán among other mills. In 1992, the year the mill closed, the average
yield in tons of cane per hecatare at Puruarán was 91.63, in contrast to the national average of 74.34; only 14 mills
surpassed Puruarán's yields, and 48 had lower averages. While the factory yield (the amount of sugar produced
per ton of cane) at Puruarán was 9.70, the national average was 9.28; only 18 mills surpassed Puruarán and 44
achieved lower factory yields. Also in 1992, extraction of sucrose during the processing of cane at Puruarán was
13.01%, while the national average was 12.36%. Puruarán was ranked twelfth in the nation. Ex-workers criticize
the owner for not carrying out the necessary procedures to determine the mill's potential profitability; however, he
intends to dismantle the mill in order to utilize its parts in the nearby Pedernales mill, purchased as part of the four
mill package.
The 1992 closing of the Puruarán mill condemned inhabitants of the Turicato region to impoverishment.
The mill, the economic hub of the region, benefitted 2,260 cane growers, 800 cane cutters, 56 truck drivers, 160
drivers of animal-pulled vehicles, 28 tractor operators, 300 factory workers, 60 temporary mill workers, 35
unionized employees, and 75 office personnel. A total of 3,774 persons were sustained by direct employment in
the mill. The economic ramifications, however, extend beyond Turicato to the adjacent municipio of Tacámbaro
and parts of Ario de Rosales and Uruapan. The economic activity and spillover effects directly and indirectly
benefitted 36,050 inhabitants of the region,

in addition to employment created throughout the state and

nation related to the distribution, consumption, and use of materials produced, including sugar and syrup. While
advocates of neoliberal policies view this mill as a white elephant, the social costs of this economic triage remain
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largely unaccounted for, except by those who bear the burden of unemployment.
Though many cane growers elected to transport their cane to the Pedernales mill, 11 km. from Puruarán,
about 900 cañeros quit cane production and abandoned 939 hectares for other uses--maize and pasture. One
thousand nine hundred cañeros (4800, including those from Pedernales) delivered their cane to the Pedernales
mill. In contrast to the economic decline at Puruarán, the Pedernales mill experienced a record harvest in 1996
(see Table 3).
[Table 3 here]
The majority of mill workers at Puruarán were also cane growers. Because the average cane field in the area
is only one hectare, the loss of employment was critical. According to the Federal Work Law, workers are to be
indemnified according to the number of years worked; but some employees who had worked their entire lives at
the mill, complained that released workers received only half what was due. Out-migration increased but most
migrants failed to find employment and returned after one or two months. Some told me, "We see the desperation
of the people. The working class is ending because there is no work." As one ex-worker explained, "If the mill is
going to stay closed, well, in the end, this is going to be a ghost town." Cultural discourse evokes contradictory
notions regarding former mill workers and producers. A FINA official in Mexico City stated simply, "It is
necessary to make adjustments" to unemployment created by mill closings. But disaccord with the interests of
cane growers is not uniform, even within the union organization, as asserted by a national UNPCA representative:
"UNPCA should defend this culture with its nails and its teeth." Though the national union struggled to prevent
the closure of mills, they could not support the Puruarán mill. The takeover of the factory (discussed below)
violated constitutional rights and the union did not want to appear as the purveyor of these actions. Twenty mills
were at risk of being closed and by supporting the Puruarán takeover, "We were going to violate 20 mills,"
explained the representative.
Clearly, the closing of the Puruarán mill affected the entire community. It created a series of grave social
problems. Thousands of unemployed workers and their families faced the difficulty of living in hunger. Average
income was $20 pesos per family per day before the closure of the mill; now, many are without income. While
deaths attributed to malnutrition increased, the health clinic was dismantled--few had health insurance (previously
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available through the mill). School dropouts and delinquency are more common. According to local workers,
businesses and services were affected by a lack of cash flow: 40% have closed since the closure of the mill. One
former worker from the mill informed me, "There are people that are crying because they don't even have enough
to pay for the electricity. The closure of the mill left a town dying because there is no work."
Puruarán, then, was one of several communities in the nation that was relegated by the neoliberal paradigm
to the politics of exclusion. It was in the interstices of such transformative processes that people began to draw
upon their cultural traditions and confirm their unity as they engaged in new strategies of confrontation and
negotiation. On December 7, 1992, some 60 mill workers, cane growers, and townspeople--including women-decided to illegally occupy and operate the sugar mill. As they returned the mill to operation, gunmen fired on
three workers. They were detained by police, but released one hour later and their weapons returned. Those
involved in the takeover, lacking the services of technicians, engineers, and chemists, repaired machinery and
processed $700,000 new pesos (about $93,333 U.S.) worth of sugar. Enough sugar was produced to make partial
payments to cane growers. Workers, in response to the mill owner's statement that they were "illiterate," and
indicating the 50 kg. bags of sugar stacked to the ceiling of the warehouse, remarked, "We ignorant workers made
all this."
The mill owner immediately contacted the state governor, who ordered in the police. Those in the mill were
arrested, jailed, and severely beaten. Others were taken from their homes at night. Of those arrested and beaten,
an elderly man with heart problems had to be hospitalized; and another individual died. Following the arrests,
twenty police were ordered to guard the mill. They cut electric cables and removed machinery to prevent the
functioning of the mill. Although the police took 40 tons of sugar, the remaining sugar, now four years old,
remains stacked in the warehouse collecting dust. The workers themselves cannot sell this sugar, since its
production involved the illegal takeover of the mill, the private property of the owner.
This crisis has increased unity among community members. The community, including former workers,
cañeros, and townspeople, is now united into a formal organization, the Committee For the Reopening of Ingenio
Puruarán. In their support, other groups have petitioned for government intervention to prevent economic
destabilization of the region. A number of professionals argue that they had the opportunity to study and to
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become teachers, and dentists, thanks to wages parents earned in the mill. The organization negotiates at local,
state, and federal levels to resolve the social repercussions of the mill's closing. Three times the Committee for
the Reopening of Ingenio Puruarán has visited the offices of the president in Mexico City, though the offices of
the federal government, the Hacienda, Financiera Nacional, and the Cámara de Diputados have given no response.
They request that the sale contract be reviewed, in light of the fact that it has not been respected. As one person
explained, "In each one of the petitions we requested solutions given our constitutional right to petition and the
response of the government is to ignore us."
The government has made an effort, however, to support micro-businesses to generate employment in the
community. Money was loaned for 15 small businesses, but all have failed due to lack of cash flow. The
government offered to install trapiches, or small-scale, labor-intensive mills for the production of piloncillo (an
unrefined form of sugar), but these already existed in the region and most had been abandoned. One social
program provided cows, but they were too old to be of value. A carpenter shop to make furniture could not
function because with high unemployment in the region, there was a lack of demand. Even a bakery could not
survive the stressed economy of the community.
When cañeros and mill workers held a meeting in February 1994 to discuss their political options, one
hundred soldiers entered Puruarán and dozens of police guarded the mill. Consequently, several years of
negotiating with various federal and state agencies proved fruitless. On June 30, 1996, workers, "tired of listening
to lies and failing to receive a concrete solution," again took over the Puruarán mill. Again the police invaded the
mill, but the workers peacefully forced them to leave. After two days, they agreed to turn the mill over to state
authorities. A decision was reached, with the approval of the governor, that a permanent guard of 30 ex-mill
workers could maintain vigilance within the confines of the sugar mill to prevent further sacking of the
installations.
Two years later, in May of 1996, another effort was made to negotiate a solution. The mill owner, cañeros,
and ex-mill workers, attended a joint meeting at which workers proposed three alternatives to the owner: 1) to
reopen the mill and operate it himself; 2) to sell the mill to cane growers, or 3) to rent the mill to them. Cañeros
presented results of formal studies which demonstrated that while profits may be minimal, the benefits of
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sustaining the community were assured by keeping the mill open (Hernández 1996:10). However, the mill owner
rejected all three alternatives on purely economic grounds. Sugar mills were sold in packets of both "good" and
"bad" mills. Many of the mills were antiquated, thus there is an incentive to invest in the more profitable mills,
while leaving the less productive mills to benign neglect or to close them. The industrialist who purchased this
group of mills is interested primarily in sugar to supply Empresas Gamesa. Less concerned with the social
repercussions, after visiting with Puruarán residents for three days, he concluded that the standard of living in the
community had improved. Locals, in contrast, maintain that it has worsened considerably.
Despite these events, workers are currently attempting to repair the mill without pay, to maintain their source
of employment. The mill owner, however, threatened in July, 1996 that if the organization continues to insist on
reopening the factory, he would leave the cane of the region, as well as that of the Pedernales mill, unprocessed.
These are not empty threats, for the leaders of the organization have been harassed, parts of the factory have
already been dismantled, and many have been refused credit for cane production. Recently, he warned that if the
situation at Puruarán is not resolved, he will close down the Pedernales mill. While the mill owner remains
insensitive to the needs of the community, the community refuses to disappear. According to one cañero, "We
campesinos have experience, we know what we are facing, and we are willing to demonstrate that we are capable
of succeeding in this project, which is very significant for Michoacán." People of Puruarán argue that generations
of cane culture cannot be destroyed by the capriciousness of one person.
Certain that the mill is a viable, potentially profitable factory (several studies demonstrate that the Puruarán
mill has the capacity to compete in quality and capacity of production with other mills of the country), the
community searches for funds to acquire the installation; however, its legal status prevents them from acquiring
the necessary financing. The committee continues to fight for the expropriation of the mill for the public benefit.
As one member of the committee explained, "We need work in order to escape from the poverty in which we find
ourselves. We don't ask for handouts or subsidies, we simply want to work. Definitively, yes, we feel the need to
produce; we feel the need to survive." Workers and cane growers in Puruarán share a common precept, "If we are
going to die slowly of hunger, we prefer to die with dignity, from a bullet, but struggling." Ex-workers guarding
the mill stated that they are willing to die in order to preserve their source of livelihood. Puruarán is considered a
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failure in the neoliberal grade book, but local residents argue for a different agenda than the acquisition of huge
profits--resolution of the social problem and survival of the people of the region.
CONCLUSION
Neoliberalism and its consequent economic restructuring are often viewed in economic terms with little
attention to the social and cultural dimensions of transformative change processes. Gledhill's reference to the
"new free-market enterprise culture" (1995:2) implies that the strategies, ideologies, and discourse of
neoliberalism should be analyzed as culture content. Both in policy and through discourse, a complex of cultural
constructs defines the underlying premises of this culture. First and foremost, paternalism must be eliminated by
withdrawing subsidies and support to inefficient producers and workers, who become defined as "overemployed," "backward," "lazy," and "ignorant." In its place, new forms of management and organization are
geared to rationalizing production in terms of efficiency, long-term profitability, and support of producers who are
willing to assimilate and become "capitalists" and "businessmen." This ideological base, then, manifests itself in
a differentiation among various types of producers and workers, while it concentrates wealth in the hands of a few
industrialists.
In the sugar sector, impressive gains were made in productivity, thus fulfilling neoliberal objectives; but in
the interstices of this dynamic transformation the social basis and cultural traditions of cane growers and mill
workers are being undermined. Two cases are considered here to illustrate the diverse ways that communities
have been affected by the imposition of neoliberalism in the Mexican countryside. In both cases, cañero culture
was historically constituted, drawing on traditions and ideologies formulated and reformulated in a revolutionary
past through experiences of struggle and resistance against haciendas and sugar mills. In one region, cañeros
chose to accommodate to the neoliberal paradigm, but their economic success has been at the expense of less
productive cañeros and liquidated mill workers. In the second case, a policy of exclusion affected not just
individuals, but an entire community. While some cañeros were able to resume their relations with the nearby
Pedernales mill, many of these same producers were also mill workers who lost their source of livelihood. As a
form of resistance to the mill closing, community members collectively drew on their cultural heritage, ideology,
and forms of organization to demand the reopening of their source of employment.

20

Based on the diverse experiences of cane growers and mill workers, I argue that the social and cultural costs
of economic triage should be carefully contemplated. Privatization of sugar mills resulted in the erosion of social
guarantees since "the longstanding responsibility of mill management...to address the needs of both the cane
growers and the community surrounding the mill has not been assumed by the new group of mill owners"
(Singelmann and Otero 1995:14). Unseen behind the facade of neoliberal culture are the human costs-unemployment, decreased health status, increased malnutrition, declining educational attainment, undermining of
community enterprises, and escalating crime rates. As entire communities are forgotten and the social costs of
modernizing the Mexican countryside discounted, local residents are uniting on the basis of their shared cultural
identities, appropriating new strategies of resistance, and refusing to disappear.
The cultural construction of cane and sugar production by mill workers and cane growers is expressed in
manifold ways, by passing a heritage of knowledge and practice from generation to generation, through material
resistance in the form of the takeover of the mill, and in an ideology that counterposes itself to the contradictions
of modernizing neoliberalism. A wall outside of the mill provides a media for expressing this ideology in artwork
and graffiti: "Zapata lives;" "An end to repression of campesinos;" next to a caricature of Salinas, "Puruarán,
¿Didn't you like my government? I am liberalism and the political parties are my accomplices;" and over a
picture of the mill owner and the state governor someone wrote, "Corrupt traitors of the working people." This
wall symbolizes the reality of a people under siege, perhaps best expressed by the Comisariado Ejidal, "Puruarán
is not a television show. It is a reality that should be seen, but above all to live and be able to understand that the
government attends to us, [and] if it does not do it in time, we will all lament the consequences" (Hernández
1996:10).
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_______________________________________________________________________________________
Table 1. Changes in Production at the National Level, 1988-89 to 1995-96.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
1988-89

1995-96

% Change

Hectares harvested
510,596
570,598
11.75
Tons of cane
34,893,129
40,185,213
15.17
Yield/hectare (tons)
68.34
70.43
3.06
Tons sugar
3,173,680
4,377,554
37.93
Kg. Sugar/hectare
6,216
7,672
33.78
% Sucrose in cane
11.65
13.46
23.42
Factory Yield (%)
9.10
10.89
19.67
Lost Time (%)
26.79
26.86
.26
Consumption of
23.73
16.87
-28.91
petroleum (lts.)
_______________________________________________________________________________________
(source: Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Alcoholera y Azucarera)
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 2. Changes in Production at the Quesería Mill, 1988-89 to 1995-96.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Surface
Field Yield
Tons
Factory
Year
Tons Cane
Harvested
Tons/ha.
Sugar
Yield
1989
367,532
9,029.00
40.71
31,012
8.438
1990
409,202
8,153.95
50.18
33,244
8.124
1991
484,377
7,088.00
68.34
38,362
7.920
1992
463,794
7,087.00
65.44
40,341
8.698
1993
618,353
7,136.25
86.65
59,180
9.571
1994
402,313
5,870.07
68.54
36,042
8.960
1995
504,075
6,126.55
82.28
52,399
10.395
1996
636,160
7,957.28
79.95
66,286
10.420
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
(source: Ingenio Quesería, S.A. de C.V.)
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 3. Changes in Production at Pedernales and Puruarán, 1989-90 to 1995-96.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Tons Cane

Surface
Harvested

Field Yield
Tons/ha.

Tons
Sugar

Factory
Yield

1990
Puruarán
Pedernales

144,940
261,176

1,729
2,594

83.85
100.70

13,244
25,621

9.14
9.81

1991
Puruarán
Pedernales

158,498
256,463

2,062
2,566

76.88
99.95

15,400
26,955

9.72
10.51

1992
Puruarán
Pedernales

123,329
191,540

1,600
2,196

91.63
87.52

14,218
19,708

9.70
10.26

1993
Pedernales

299,874

3,254

92.17

30,035

10.02

1994
Pedernales

261,758

3,498

74.83

28,010

10.70

1995
Pedernales

345,000

4,132

83.49

37,950

11.00

Year

1996
Pedernales
382,111
4,196
91.06
43,607
11.41
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
(source: Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Alcoholera y Azucarera)
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